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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MARRINER W. ME·RRILL FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

vs.

8192

TI-IE STATE T'AX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defend~nt.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ON WRIT OF' CERTIORARI
from
THE S.TATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Matter is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari.
The plaintiff, the Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc., was ·duly and regularly incorporated under
the Laws of the State of Utah as a non-profit organizaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion on September 7, 1950. Subsequent to this incorporation, the Corporation Franchise Tax Section of the State
Tax Commission of Utah did on or about October 24,
'
1950, assess against this corporation
the minimum franchise tax in the amount of $10.00.
The plaintiff filed a protest and petition with said
Commissioner and requested a re-determination, which
said petition culminated in a hearing before a legally
constituted quorum of the Commission on the 13th day
of August, 1953, in a proceeding entitled ''IN THE MATTER OF THE CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX
HEARING OF MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY
FOUNDATION, INC."
On April 1, 1954, the said Commission issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision
whereby the said Commission found that the :l\1arriner
W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. \Vas a taxable corporation unde~r Title 59, Chap~ter 13, Utah Code, Annotated,
1953, that the Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation,
Inc. was not organized an~d operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes and the net earnings can inure to a private shareholder or individual and therefore said corporation was
adjudged to he a corporation which does not ·come within
any of the exemptions provided in Title 59, Chapter 13,
Section 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As a result of
this determination, the plaintiff filed its petition of Writ
of Certiorari on April28, 1954, with the Writ being made
returnable May 18, 1954.
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At the formal hearing before the State Tax Commissioner there vvas introduced in evidence the Affidavit
of Incorporation (Tax Commissioner's Exhibit No. 1),
the By-Laws of the F·oundation, (Taxpayer's Exhibit
"A"), and oral testimony.
The purpose of the Foundation, as set forth in the
Affidavit of Incorporation, is as follows:

"* * * for the purpose of receiving by gift, devise,
bequest, or otherwise, n1oney or ·credits, and other
items of real and personal property, and to invest
and reinvest the same and to apply the income
therefrom, together with so much of the principal
thereof as may be deemed necessary and advisable
for loaning or otherwise advancing money and
property, on such terms as the Board of Directors
may determine, to any and all descendents and
husbands or wives of such descendents of Marriner W. Merrill, whether or not such person is a
member of said corporation, for the educational
uses in any school, college, university, or special
training institutions, in any part of the world and
without ~n any way limiting or restricting the
general purposes hereinbefore stated, to aid and
assist financially or otherwise in the training of
any member of the family, whether the same be
a direct descendent or by marriage, in the acquiring of scholastic training and educational advancement in religious, literary, scientific, artistic,
professional, vocational or smiliar branches of
learning, conditioned only upon the control of the
assets of said Corporation for the aforesaid uses
thereof by the Directors of said Corporation ; * * *. "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The By-Laws of the Foundation \Vere a'dn1itted as
Taxpayer's Exhibit "A" ( T. 15). The portions specificnlly ap,plicable to the question herein are:
Article ·One, Section Two, ''Said Foundation shall receive and accept
from any member ·or any other person, either by
gift, devise, bequest, or otherwise, any money,
credit, or other types of real or personal property,
all of which shall be handled and managed by the
Board of Directors as hereinafter recited and for
the uses and purposes of this ·corporation:"
Article Four, Section Nine, ''The Board of Directors may appoint a special committee with power to accept contributions
and to act upon all applications of prospective
stude·nts for loans or other assistance from the
Foundation, and such committee's decision in such
matters shall always be subject to the right of
ap,p,eal of such applicant to the Board of DireC-

tors:''
Article Five, Section One, ''In order to earry out the objective of the Foundation, the Board of Direetors, or a committee
appointed by it, may receive, invest and reinvest,
all funds and property of the Foundation, and
may loan or otherwise advance to any applicant
for assistance such funds as may be deemed proper :and adequate £or the accomplishment of the
purposes ·of said applicant and of this Foundaation. ''
Article Five, Section Two, ''Any member of the Marriner W. Merrill
Family, either by blood or marriage, and \vhether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the same be a member of the Corporation or not,
shall be entitled to borrow and receive from the
Foundation such sums and amounts of money,
and upon such terms, and at such rate of interest,
as the Board of Directors may from time to time
prescribe, which money, however, shall be used for
the sole and exclusive purpose of assisting said
applicant in attendance at such school, college,
university, or special training institution, wherever located, and for the purpose of educational,
religious, professional, scientific, literary, artistic,
vocational, or similar branches of learning;
provided, nevertheless, that said Board of Directors, or the committee appointed by it, shall at
.all times have ,complete power and discretion in
determining whether the loan shall be made, and
if made the amount, length of time, rate of interest, and other eonditions of said loan, always bearing in mind the amount of funds for such purpose,
the number of applicants, and the expense incident
thereto, with the objective of equitably dividing
available funds for the aid of all applicants."
Article Five, Section Three, ''Said Board may also in its discretion assist
any applicant to borrow at any bank or trust ,company for any of the purposes recited in Section
two hereof, and the officers of this Corporation
shall have the power to endorse or sign with said
applicant any note at any such bank or trust company for such purposes and pledge as security for
the payment thereof such asset of said Foundation
as it may deem advisable and make such requirements of said applicant as it may deem proper.''
The only oral testin1ony received at the hearing was
that of A. L. Merrill, called as a witness on behalf of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Foundation (T. 8-12). Mr. !Ierrill is the President of
the l\1:arriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. During his testimony it was stipulated ( T. 10) "That to date
hereof there has been contributed to said corporation by
interested members the total sum of $1,628.00. Two loans
have been made to students for educational purposes: one
to the grand-daughter of a sister of a wife of Marriner
W. Merrill, but the gran·d-daughter, I understand, is not
a descen.dent of any member of the family, for the purpose of studying nursing in S:alt Lake City; and another
loan to a great-grandson of Marriner \V. Merrill for his
education at the Utah State Agricultural College."
Mr. Merrill further testifie-d (T. 10) that "The· Affidavit is broad enough to permit the loaning of money to
any descendent of a husband or a wife who subsequently
married a member of the Merrill Family. This is so, even
though such a person be not a descendent of Marriner W.
Merrill.''
On page 11 of the Transcript is found the following:
"MR. DAY: The beneficiary doe:s not necessarily
have to be a. member of the corporation.
''MR. MERRILL : No, the beneficiaries are not
me·mhers of' th!at. They don't have to be members of the
corporation, an·d in these instan·ces are not members of
the corp'Oration.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The money is donated with the understanding as
provided in the Affidavit and By-Laws without any refund or return to the donors 'Of any kind or eharacter, or
by way of interest or dividends or otherwise; and that
money is used exclusively in the future for the purpose
of loaning money to students within the qualifications
mentioned to go to college in any part of the world. And
the objective of the Foundation is to provide for educational development of individuals that the Board of
Directors may determine are within the rights under the
Affidavit to make the loan.
"I believe that is all.
''MR. ALLEN: Counsel for the Commission will
stipulate to the statement with the exception of the
limitation that donors who are participants in the Affidavit itself may receive benefits from the corporation.
''MR. MERRILL: I agree that there might be some
instances where a donor might have a loan made to him,
but he would have to pay it back just as anyone else.
He would never receive it as a dividend or a refund of
any amount he had ever paid.
"MR. DAY: That last statement, may we have it
understood, is testimony under oath and not part of the
stipulation.''
The issue involved is whether or not the Marriner W.
11errill Family Foundation, Inc. is an exempt corporation under the provisions of Section 59-13-4, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
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It is the position of the appellant that the Fol;lndation is for the purpose of receiving gifts, ·devises, bequests, or other properties from any donor to be used
for the purpose of loaning or other"Tise advancing money
or property on such terms as the Board of Directors
might determine to any and all descendents and husbands
or wives of such descendents of ~Iarriner W. Merrill for
educational uses in any school, college, university, or
special training institution in any part of the world. The
loans are not restricted to members of the corporation
and there is no return to any ·donor, either of principal,
or interest, or dividend. The Foundation is solely for
educational and ·charitable uses and for no other purpose.
It is, therefore, ·claimed that this corporation Is
exempt under the laws of the State of Utah.
POINT I.
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC.
IS EXEMPT AS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED AND
OPERATED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

As an exemption from the Corporation Franchise
Tax imposed by the State of Utah, Section 59-13-4, Utah
C·ode Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
''The following corporations are exempt from
the provisions of this chapter, to wit:

"* * *
'' (4) Corporations and any Community
Chest, Fund or Foundation, organized and operated e~clusively for religious, charitable scientific, literary or educational purposes, 01: for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prevention of cruelty to ·children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit ·of any private stockholder or individual."
It is submitted that the Marriner W. Merrill Family
Foundation, Inc. is organized and carried on for ·charitable and educational purposes within the above statute.
This statute is an exact copy of Section 101 (6)
Internal Revenue Code which exempts arganizations
from income tax under the Federal Income Tax Laws.
This section of the Utah Code, as far as we have been
able to determine, has not been construed by the Courts
in any manner applicable herein. However, the Federal
Statute has been, in numerous instances, considered by
the Courts.
The best definition of charity in this regard is found
in the case of Bok vs. McCaughn, 42 F. 2d 616. In this
case, an association was formed to accept gifts and donations; and to, in turn, recognize and reward by payment
of $10,000.00 the person selected each year as the one
whose act or service was most advantageous to the City
of Philadelphia or its inhabitants.
The Court, on page 618, is quoted as follows:
"Charity, derived from the Latin Caritas,
·originally meant love. In the thirteenth chapter
·of First Corinthians the revised version uses the
wurd ''love in defining the third of the three
cardinal virtues which, in King James' version
read ''Faith, Hope and Charity.'' It was with
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similiar emphasis on the motive which prompts
action that Mr. Binney framed his app-roved definition of a charitable trust in his argument in the
Girard will case : ''Whatever is given for the love
of God, or the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense, given from these motives
and to these ends, free from the stain or taint of
every consideration that is a personal, private, or
selfish." Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 128,
11 L. Ed. 205 (1844) which is quoted by the Supreme Court in Ould v. Washington I-Iospital,
95 U.S. 311, 24 L. Ed. 450. Charity means such
unselfish things as are wont to be done by those
who are animated by the virtue of love. Thus the
Supreme Court of the United States, following
Chancellor Kent, Lord Lyndhurst, and Lor·d Camden, has defined a ·charitable trust as ''a gift to
a general public use which extends to the poor as
well as to the rich." Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 506,
16 L. Ed. 701 (1860). So, also, Mr. Justice Gray
speaking for the Supreme Court of lVIassachusetts
in Jackson v. Phillip~s, 14 Allen 556 (1867), declared a charitable gift to be one "for the benefit
of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their minds or hearts under the influence
of education or religion, by relieving their bodies
from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting
them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining publie buildings or \Yorks or
otherwise lessening the bur·dens of government.''
"It ·cannot he doubted that Mr. Bok's gift was
a charitable gift as the word "charitable" is used
and understood by courts and lavvmaking bodies.
What he did was done for the love of his neighbors
in the community which he had adopted as his
home. Every activity recognized by the awards
that have been made is an activity for the promoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion of which a charitable trust might be created.
A trust for popular education in music, or for
making higher education accessible to the many,
or for stimulating American patriotism by recalling the unselfish sacrifices of the fathers, or for
the relief of human suffering through new and
improved surgical methods, or for the encouragement of craftsmanship, or for the beautification
of a city, would be a charitable trust tested by any
of the definitions which the authorities supply.
And if a trust for the promotion of any one of
these interests would be a charitable trust, it
follows that a foundation to promote all of them
is a trust that partakes of the nature of each.''
It should be noted furthermore that ·charity is not
confined to the financial aid of the poor or indigent, but
may be devoted to increasing and fostering qualities of
industry, loyalty, persistence or for the desire for education and general betterment of individuals as ·citizens.
All of these are clearly for the public good and for the
advancement and protection of society. A short definition of "charitable" in its legal sense in construing statutes of this type has been frequently set out as ":some
public benefit open to an indefinite number of persons."
Public benefits, however, cannot be given a narrow construction such as would confine it to cases where a person
is taken off the State relief rolls, or where an orphan is
taken out of a state orphan institution. Public benefit
embraces a much wider and all inclusive meaning, and
is set forth in the Bok case above. In the case of Harrison
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F. 2d 286 (C.C.A.7.) the
Court V{as dealing with a corporation primarily devoted
to the g'ranting of pensions to employees of a specified
corporation. The Court says, on page 288:
"In the present cases neither the appellee nor
the donor was a hen,eficiary or interested either
directly or indirectly in the dissolved company.
The persons to whom annuities "\\Tere paid were
those who had remained loyal in the service of the
retired company and who had proved their steadfastness of character by long years 'Of service.
Elements taken into consideration were years of
service, age, marital status and the offspring of
the persons to whom annuities should be paid, and
at the time annuitants becam'e the recipients they
must have reached the ordinarily alloted span of
life in order to receive in their old age their rewards. for fidelity, steadfastness and persistence
in industry. For this purpose the donor was inspired to create the fund and to reward them by
annuities. The inevitable effect of such action was
to encourage, generally, among employers, the desire to promote similiar rewards for the qualities
mentioned and, among employees, industry, persistence of effort, and loyalty. Clearly such purposes are charitable as Congress has used the
'vord in the exemption statutes, as the Courts
have construed the same.

"* * * *
"Appellant insists that ap·pellee was not operated exclusively for exempt purposes. But we
have observed that many purely ·charitable organizations were beneficiaries in the fund and that
the only question as to exemption of all funds is
that urged as to the sums paid out in the form of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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annuities. And we have seen that the purpose of
the latter payments were praiseworthy and the
inevitable effect the encouragement and promotion of habits upon the part of employer and
employees, tending to the greater good of the
whole body politic. The fact that some annuitant
may not need the pension is immaterial, just as in
one of the cited cases the fact that persons who
had performed unusual services and thus would
become entitled to rewards might not need the
same. There is no taint of personal or selfish
motives. The donor gained nothing except to promote a plan of just reward to persons to whom
she owed nothing, for virtues worthy of emulation
in people generally; ~to ·satisfy a desire to see that
loyal employees should be rewarded and not live
in want or indigent circumstances."
It should be further understood, as set out in the
Harrison case just eited, that a s~tatute providing for exemption from taxes of corporations or foundations for
relief, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes will be liberally -construed, since exemption is a
matter of grace, and an act of public justice. In other
words, when dealing with the question of ·exemption, or
a corporation organized for these purposes, the general
rule that the exemptions must be specific, clear and unequivocal does not apply and the statute should be given
a liberal interpretation in order to more completely realize its basic aim. C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, ( C.C.A. 3) 190 F'. 2d 120; U. S. v.
Proprietors of Social Law Library (C. C. A. 1) 102 F 2d.
481.
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The restriction of the beneficiaries to a designated
group or class does not deny .the exempt ·classification. In
the editorial :comment found in C. C. H. (Custom Clearing House, Inc.) Federal Tax Reporter Se·ction 656.02,
i·t is said:
"As to charitable organizath)ns the department announced ~that the term ''charitable'' in its
legal sense 'contemplates some public benefit open
to an indefinite number of persons.' Accordingly,
an association organized and operated for the
purpose of administering a fund w·hich "\Yas to be
used for the benefit of those who made regular
contributions, thereto, or their dep.endents, was
not exempt. ( S. l\1:. 3028, IV-1 CB 215). Similiar
holdings were made S. M. 5699 (V-1 CB 80) and
G. ·C. M. 1268 (VI-1 CB 83). On the other hand,
the Board held that the exemption was not intended to apply ~to 'public charities' only, stating:
'We do not think that the mere restriction of the
beneficiaries of an other\\rise charitable eorpora~tion to a designated group or class is sufficient
ground upon which to deny exempt classification." * * * Following that decision the Commissioner in G. C. M. 19028 (1937-2 CB 125) ruled
that an employees' organization administering a
fund to which the employees contributed a minor
portion was exempt. ''
There are innumerable cases wherein the designation
of charitable organizations was given to group of associates designed f'Or the benefit of a special exclusive
group. In Y.M.C.A. Retirement Fund, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 139,
and Rike, 18 B.T.A. 149, a eorporation to provide retirement annuities for superannuated or disabled secretaries
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the Y.l\l.C.A. which derives its funds from public contributions and fron1 volunteer contributions of associates
and members of the Y.M.C.A., no part of which inured to
the benefit of any private individual, was exempt. This
ruling was acquiesced in by the Treasury Department. In
other \vords, a group was ·charitable when its sole purpose
\Vas to provide retirement salaries for secretaries of the
Y.M.C.A. We submit there can be no more clearly defined or exclusive group of beneficiaries than these.
In G. C. l\II. 19028, 1937-2 CB 125 the General Counsel
of the Treasury Department held that an organization
engaged in administering a fund consisting ~of amounts
contributed by the employees and the employers and
others, for financial relief of employees or their families,
(police officers) is a charitable organization if the employee beneficiaries contribution to the fund represents
a minor portion of the corporation's incon1e. This ruling
revoked S.M. 3028 (IV-1, CB 80) \vhich denied exemption
\Vhere benefits \vere limited to a prescribed class of
employees of a certain manufacturer, and G. C. M. 1268
(VI-1, CB 83), vvhich denies exemption where benefits

vvere confined to n1embers of the association and vvere dependent on regular payment of dues, and \vhere payments
of benefits vvas not discretionary.
The Treasury Departn1ent has also acquiesced in the
case of Sibley, 16 B. T.A. 915, which declared 'a corporation operated solely to expend sick and disability aid to
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a specific department store's employees, deriving its income solely fro1n contributions and interest on investInents, \Vas exempt.
In the case of Gimbel v. C'Ommissioner ·of Internal
Revenue, 54, F. 2d 780, a foundation whose don1inant
purpose was to grant pensions to those who served
Gimbel Brothers, Inc. for over 25 y·eHrs \Vas held to be
an exempt corporation; this ease cites as auth·ority such
cases as Bok v. MeCaughn, 42 F. 2d 616; Mutual Aid
an·d Benefit A·sS'ociation of Forstmann and Huffmann
Employees v. Con1missioner, 42 F. 2d 619; Sibley 16
B. T .A. 915; Eagen v. Commissioner, 43 F 2d 881;
Y.M.C.A. Retirement Fund, 18 B.T.A. 139. The case
says as follo\vs :
"In reaching the conclusion to exempt these
contributions to charity, we feel, as said in the
Bok case, we do not 'defeat the obvious purpose
of Congress to encourage gifts of the class under
consideration' and we are in accord with Horace
Binney's definition of charity and quote viz.:
'whatever is given for * * * the love of thy neighbor * * * given from these motive·s and to these
ends, free from the strain or taint of every consideration that is personal, p·rivate, or selfish.' "
In the ease of Harrison v. Barker Annuity

~F'und,

90 F. 2d 286, it is said, on page 289 :
"In the language of 2 Bogert, Trusts and
Tru'Stees, par. 362, P. 1093: 'Lastly a trust 1nay
have as its o:bject the improvement' of the condition of a definite group of known individuals in
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a mental, n1oral or physical \vay. Here the cestuis
are fron1 the beginning fixed and identifiable and
are always to he such. There is to be no addition
to the class. F·or example·, a pubiic subscription
may be taken for the victims of a certain flood,
fire, or tornado. Here the persons who suffered
physical injury or lost property a~s a result of this
event n1ay v1ell be easily discoverable In a short
ti1ne the trustees of the fund could learii the na1nes
and addresses of all the members of the class.
The benefits to 'be conferred are of the type which
usually validate charitable trusts; that is, they
involve the relief of sickness, injury, and poverty.
Shall the fact that these benefits are to go to definite persons make the trust private~ It would
see1n here that each court 'Should decide for itself
\vhether the size of the class to be aided is such
that there is a general public interest in the carrying out of the trust, or whether the relief is so
limited in amount as to 1nake it solely a matter of
interest of the individual sufferers.' We conclude
that the appellee is exe1npt from the taxes assessed vvithin the meaning of the statute."
In the case of An2y Hu,tchison Crellin v. Com.missioner, 46 B. T. A. 1152, there was created a trust providing,
an1ong other things, as follows:
"Eighth: That this Trust Agreement has for
its purpose the· giving of assistance in the education of youth and in particular the giving of financial aid to persons of college age whose circumstances prohibit such advantage's.
(A) That to this end the fallowing persons shall
first become eligible to receive financial aid and
may apply for such aid under the following conditions:
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(Here foliows a list of the names of fourteen persons, the grandnephews and grandnieees of Amy
Hutchison Crellin.)
(B) That funds in the hands of the Foundation
which are not required to carry out the p~rovisions
of this Trust Agreement under paragraph "A" of
this Article "Eighth", sub-paragraphs 1 to 6, both
inclusive, shall he (Used for educ.a:tional aid to
young members of the First Methodist Church
of Pasa~dena, Pasadena, ·California. The conditions for such aid shall he stipulated by the Foundation, and may be in the form of loans or gifts."
lt is to be noted that this Fnundation was for two
pu-rpose'S: First, the financial aid to fourteen named,
living grandnephews and grandnieces ; and, second, loans
or gifts to young members of a designated church. Four
applications by church members were approved in 1941
and the loans ma:de.
·On page 1155 of the opinion of the Board, the Board
held:
"If the trust had designated as beneficiaries
oniy those stated in ~subdivision B, the statutory
exemption would hardly he doubtful. Such a trust
would he a means of providing for education, without p·ersonal sp~ecification or identification, of the
young people of a church of the cormnunity, and
this would be enough to establish the charitable
character of the trust. In re Henders'On's Estate,
112 Pac. (2d) 605; In re Willey's Estate, 128 Ca.
1; 60 Pac. 471."
The trust in this opinion was held to be non-charitable, however, because its p·ri~ary purpose was deterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mined to be the educational provision for the fourteen
nan1ed individuals. On page 1156 the Board says:
~'Behind the instru1nent, the evidence sh:ows
that the trust vva.s 'born of the settlor'·s desire to
provide education for her fourteen grandnephews
and grandnieces, ·~ * ·~. On the excess of the fund
is to be devoted to the education of young people
of the church; and in view of the amount of the
fund and the number of prirnary beneficiaries, it
is apparent that the aid provided for the church
n1e1nbers is incidental to the 1na.in object of the
trust.

''For this rea;son, it can not be said that the
trust is a public charitable trust; the exemption
is defeated by the specific enumeration of the
settlor's grandnephe\vs and grandnieces as the individual beneficiaries."
This ease is noteworthy on two points: (A) A trust
es1a~blished to provide funds for loans for educational
purposes is charitable vvithin the meaning of the statute
and en titles a corporation to exemp·tion. This case also
recognizes sueh a eorporation to be charitable and does so
\vithout dispute. (B) A group, such as "the young people
of the First l\iethodist Church of Pasadena, Pasadena,
California," ean be recipients of the benefits of a. trust
and still the trust is charitable in nature. Under the
~[errill Family Foundation, all descendant·s, and husbands and \Vives of descendants, are eligible. This is
certainly no n1ore restrictive than is the provision in the
Crellin Trust for the young people of the First Methodist
Church ·of Pasadena. The Crellin Trust was held non-
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charitable, because its predominant purpose was the education of fourteen nan1ed people. It was, however, held
to be unquestionably entitled to he classed as charitable
if it had included only the beneficiaries designated as
"the young people of the First Methodist Church of
Pasadena." There appears to be no valid distinction between this class of beneficiaries design a ted in the Crellin
Trust and the class of Beneficiaries de signa ted in the
Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc.
In the ca'Se of Emerit E. Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner,
40 B. T. A. 555, a c.orp·oration was formed for the followIng purposes :
"The object for which it is formed is to use its
property, funds and income for any or all of the
following purposes; To establish, build, improve
and maintain parks, public grounds, public buildings, public baths and play grounds, and contribute to the support of any of the foregoing descr~bed projections or institutions; to help and aid
cri P'P·led · rchildr~n ;, · {to render financial aid to
worthy young people seeking an education; to receive and accept gifts, bequests and devises. * * *"
Here again a corporation was held to be charitable,
whose purpose included rendering financial aid to
worthy young p·eople seeking an education. It is to be
noted also that a later restriction placed on this grant
by wish of the donor in his will restricted the financial
aid for education "preferably for the -children of employees of Kewanee Boiler Company * * *." (See page
557). Here again a charitable corporation was for a
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group ·of beneficiaries even n1ore restrictive than those
in the ~fer rill Farnily F·ounda tion, and the charitable
corporation was for the purpose of rendering financial
aid to 'vorthy young people seeking an education. It is
further interesting to note that student loans were granted, and as is stated on page 559 :
''The student loans "\vere all secured by pronli'ssory notes payable to petitioner six years from
date, 'vith interest at 6 percent per annum from
the date of maturity."
And on page 559, the Court states:
"There can be no doubt, and apparently the
respondent does not contend otherwise, that the
objects and purposes for which the petitioner was
organized Ineet the require1nents of the statute
for exen1ption from tax. They were purely charitable and educational."
POINT II.
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC.
IS EXEMPT AS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED AND
OPERATED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES.

The statute also exempts organizations which are
organized for educational

pu1~oses.

Here again the

"\vord educational must be construed in its broadest
sense and i's not confined to associations which operate
schools or colleges. In C. C. H. (Custom Clearing
House, Inc.), Standard Federal Tax Reporter, Section 656.02 it is said that educational institutions need
not be schools or colleges in order to be exempt. Section
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654 of the above cited voltune states that an educational
organization within the meaning of the Internal Re~enue
Code is one designed primarily for the improve1nent
or development of the capa:.bilities of the individual.
The educational purpose n1ay he one designed for the
benefit of an undivided nUlll!ber of persons. by bringing
their minds and hearts under the influence of education
and to 1nake higher education accessible (Bok v. McCa,·ughn,

42 F. 2d 616).

As examples of the wide scope of the meaning of
"educa~tional", the following are submitted:
"A corporation organized to maintain a hand
for giving free p~ublic concerts and the promotion
of musical art is exempt as an educational institution, the terms not being confined to colleges
and schools (I.T. 1475, 1-2 ·C.B. 184.) Tills bulletin of the Income Tax Division of the Internal
Revenue Bureau goes on to say that the fostering
of an appreciation or a desire of good music and
of the promotion of musical art are actually of
an educational nature.
An ass-ociation organized and operated exclusively for giving musical concerts vvas exempt
as education. S.M. 1176, 1 C.B. 147.
The N a:tional Tax Association is exempt, being organized and op·erated exclusively for scientific and educ.a.tiona1 purposes ( sp,ecial rule, February 11, 1939, 393 C. C. H., paragrap11 6180).
College stud.ents leagu.e, organized to bring
about an open-1n1nded consideration of social in-

'
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dustrial, political and international questions, was
exempt as exclusively educational (I.T. 1224, I-1
C.B. 256).
It is, of c.ourse, a stated purpose of the Merrill Family Foundation to grant loans to any and all descendants
and the husbands or wives of such descendants of Marriner \V. nierrill. This clearly is for the fostering of education to assure that the benefits of education may be
taken advantage of by increasing nurnbers of people, all
of \vhich is certainly toward the common good of the
public and of society. The purposes to he accomplished
are certainly not limited to personal or private conc.ern,
as the funds are available to any and all of those who
con1e \vithin its classification no matter how far removed
or rernote. The granting of a loan to enable a student in
the year 2000 to attend a college in the United States is
eertainly no personal benefit to the memhers of the current Board of Directors and is certainly no personal or
private concern of them. It should further he noted that
the beneficiaries of the F'oundation are certainly not
lin1ited to those whose last names might be

~lerrill,

as

the husband of a female descendant of Marriner W.
}Ierrill qualifies for a loan.
The cases of A1ny Hutchison Crellirn and Enter·it E.

Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner, cited above, are, we, submit,
square authority that a corporation designed to give financial aid, by way of loans to persons for educational
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purposes, co1nes \Yithin the language of the exen1ption
statute and rather than to quote the pertinent portions of
those decisions again, reference is made here\vith to them.

POINT III.
NO PART OF THE NET EARNINGS OF THE ·CORPORATION
INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF ANY PRIVATE
SHAREHOLDER OR INDIVIDUAL.

The Foundation has, essentially, three sources of
funds. One is the voluntary gifts and contributions fron1
individuals (Article I, Section Two of By-Laws) without
restriction and from anyone, he he member or nonmember; another is the funds derived from the Annual
Member who pays a minin1mn annual fee of $1.00 per
year and the Sustaining Member who pays $100.00, who
are restricted to descendants of Marriner W. Merrill ori
any person who 1narries a descendant. (Article II of the'
By-Laws) The third is from whatever interest or returns
are realized from the investment of funds.
There is no provision whatever for payn1ent of dividends, bonuses, gratuities, or any sums in any form to
the members. They cannot, under the corporation charter
and By..:Laws, realize any return as a result of their
meln'bership~. The membership· dues are in a fixed amount,
bearing no relationship to the funds of the corporation
or its net earnings, and there is certainly no provision
wh-ereby the membership dues would be reduced if the
income of the corporation becomes large. No mem·ber
is entitled to a single benefit-either pecuniary or in
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property-from his me1nhership. His only benefit is the
well-recognized benefit of personal satisfaction and the
satisfying of the desire to help those who are less fortunate.
The record in the proceedings bears this out. On
T -11, ~1r. n1errill states :

''MR. MERRILL: No, the beneficiaries are
not members of tha.t. They don't have to be Inemhers of the corporation, and in these instances are
not Inembers of the corporation.
"The money is donated with the understanding as provided in the Affidavit and By-Laws
without any refund or return to the donors of any
kind or character, or by way of interest or dividends or otherwise; and that money is used exclusively in the future for the purpose of loaning
money to students within the qualifications mentioned to go to college in any part of the world.
And the objective of the Foundation is to provide
for educational development of individuals that
the Board of Directors may determine are within
the rights under the Affidavit to make the loan."
This was considered as testimony under oath and
there is nothing whatever in the record to rebut it.
While it is true that a member may secure financial
assistance- for education, yet this assistance is in no way
dependent upon his being a member. The By-Laws expressly provide (Article V. Section 2) that those who
receive assistance need not he members. If a n1ember did
receive such hel·p, it would have to be on the san1e footing
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and basis as a non-member, ,vith the sa.n1e obligations.
That some of the members may receive help, does not
destroy the~ exemption. For exan1ple, 1nemhers of the
American Legion may be beneficiaries of its fund for
disabled veterans, hut the fund itself would not be deprived of its exemption. (C. C. H. F'ederal Tax Reporter,
Section 656.04). A member of the Polio Foundation or
Red Cross may receive aid, not because he \vas a Inelnber, b~ut because of his need, and that would not deprive
the fund of its exemption.
The case of Bohemian Gyrnnastic Asso. Sokol of
City of New York v. Higgins, 147 Fd 774 is, in this regard,
of some importance. Therein the Association "\Vas considered educational, with no benefits inuring to shareholders or individuals. Membership dues and the running
of a commercial bar and restaurant provided the funds.
The court, on page 777, states:

"If Bohemian were a 1nere social club such
receip~ts from persons other than 1ne1nbers n1ight
he regarded as earnings from a business beyond
normal corp·orate purposes and ordinary returns
from investments of its property, and also n1ight
be regarded as inuring to the benefit of its members by lessening their dues. We have construed
statutory exen1ptions some\Yha.t na.rro,vly in the
case of social clubs and have treated income derived hy them from outside sources if considerB1hle in. a1nount .and recurrent, as d~stroying the
exemption. But In the case of educational or charitable corporations the exemption is construed
broadly as we held that it should be in Roche's
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Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 776, 779,
supra. See also Helvering v. Bliss, 193 U. S. 144,
150 55 S. Ct. 17, 79 L. Ed. 246, 95 A.L.R. 207;
Jones v. Better Business Bureau of ·Oklahoma
City, 10 Cir., 123 F. 2d 767, 769; United States y.
I)roprietors oif Social La\v Lihra.ry, 1 Cir., 102
F. 2d 481, 482. If so construed, the words 'inure
to fhe benefit' would, we think, require son1e benefit other than mere membership and a possible
reduction in the amount of dues contributed to
the very educational or charitable objeets for
which the corporation vvas organized. By this
interpretation of the exemption clause the very
reasonable decision of the First Circuit in United
States v. Proprietors of Social Law Lihrary, 102
F. 2d 481, supra, can be reconciled with the Jockey
Club and West Side Tennis Club decisions, supra,
where we dealt only with the exemption in relation to social clubs.
"The benefit that is conferred upon the members in the ca:se at bar is really an opportunity
to receive and promote a certain type of education.
Their contributions in the way of dues, whether
more or less in amount, are also for educational
purposes. We cannot believe that the statute wa:s
ever intended to preclude an exen1ption in such
a case. The result n1ight be to deprive a religious,
charitable or educational corporation which raised
money through entertainn1ents or some business
not representing its primary objects of any exemption, if organized with members paying trifling dues, and to grant an exemption if no dues
were to be paid. The distinction seems to us an
unreal one. We think an exemption under the
present circun1stances has never been denied."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

InNorthu:estern Jobbers' Credit Bureau v. CoJnuzissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 F. 2d 880, the Court defines the phrase "inures to the benefit of any privateshareholder or individual" as "meaning to serve to the
use or benefit of such shareholders." See also Cornn~is
sioner of Internal Revenue v. Orton, 173 F. 2d 483, 488.
It is submitted that a dollar donated to this Foundation
would no more inure to the benefit of the donor than
would a dollar donated to the Red Cross, the Polio Foundation, the University of Utah, or the church of the
donor's choice.
CONCLUSION
The above discussion has been for the purpose of
pointing out that the l\1arriner W. l\ferrill Fan1ily F·oundation, Inc. meets each and every test in1posed by the
exemption statute. It is submitted that the Foundation
clearly meets all requirements and should be held to con1e
within the statute granting the exemptions.
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